Translucent Onion: January 2011

What is "reality"?

How much of "reality" do I actually "perceive" or in other words, how much is my view different from the "real view"?

What is knowledge?

What is an explanation?

1. The Problems of Philosophy by Russell:

All knowledge, we find, must be built up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing is left. But among our instinctive beliefs some are much stronger than others, while many have, by habit and association, become entangled with other beliefs, not really instinctive, but falsely supposed to be part of what is believed instinctively. Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible....There can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance. It is of course possible that all or any set of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have reason to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief.
When it is said that light is waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses.
So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical sun they afford evidence as to the physical sun of eight minutes ago; if the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing the sun'. This affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects....If one object looks blue and another red, we may reasonably presume that there is some corresponding difference between the physical objects; if two objects both look blue, we may presume a corresponding similarity. But we cannot hope to be acquainted directly with the quality in the physical object which makes it look blue or red. Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that familiarity which we might have supposed them to have. And what holds for colors is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus we find that, although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses. The question remains whether there is any other method of discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects.
We have spoken of acquaintance with the contents of our minds as self-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our self: it is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. The question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves, as opposed to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one, upon which it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I', though the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things.
We may therefore sum up as follows what has been said concerning acquaintance with things that exist. We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense - thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things.
In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call universals, that is to say, general ideas, such as whiteness, diversity, brotherhood, and so on. Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a universal of which we are aware is called a concept. It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other people's minds. These things are known to us by what I call 'knowledge by description',....
Do any number of cases of law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that will be fulfilled in the future?....It is to be observed that all such expectations are only probable; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they must be fulfilled, but only for some reason in favour of the view what they are likely to be fulfilled.
The mere fact that something has happened a certain number of times causes animals and men to expect that it will happen again....But science habitually assumes, at least as a working hypothesis, that general rules which have exceptions can be replaced by general rules which have no exceptions...When two things are found to be often associated, and no instance is known of the one occurring without the other, does the occurrence of one of the two, in a fresh instance, give any good ground for expecting the other?
The general principle of science, such as the belief in the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are beliefs of daily life. All such general principles are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed.
In regard to probable opinion, we can derive great assistance from coherence, which we rejected as the definition of truth, but often use as a criterion. A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually. It is in this way that many scientific hypotheses acquire their probability. They fit into a coherent system of probable opinions, and thus become more probable than they would be in isolation. The same thing applies to general philosophical hypotheses. Often in a single case such hypotheses may seem highly doubtful, while yet, when we consider the order and coherence which they introduce into a mass of probable opinion, they become pretty nearly certain. This applies, in particular, to such matters as the distinction between dreams and waking life. If our dreams, night after night, were as coherent one with another as our days, we should hardly know whether to believe the dreams or the waking life. As it is, the test of coherence condemns the dreams and confirms the waking life. But this test, though it increases probability where it is successful, never gives absolute certainty, unless there is certainty already at some point in the coherent system. Thus the mere organization of probable opinion will never, by itself, transform it into indubitable knowledge.
Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that it is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.
The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in unfamiliar aspect. Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value - perhaps its chief value - through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife....Thus to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy: Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

2. The Fabric of Reality by David Deutsch

One comparatively simple and comprehensible theory can cover an infinity of indigestible facts....What makes the general theory of relativity so important is not that it can predict planetary motions a shade more accurately than Newton's theory can, but that it reveals and explains previously unsuspected aspects of reality, such as the curvature of space and time.
To instrumentalists, the idea that science can enable us to understand the underlying reality that accounts for our observations is a fallacy and a conceit. They do not see how anything a scientific theory may say beyond predicting the outcomes of experiments can be more than empty words. Explanations, in particular, they regard as mere psychological props: a sort of fiction which we incorporate in theories to make them more easily remembered and entertaining.
The overwhelming majority of theories are rejected because they contain bad explanations, not because they fail experimental tests. We reject them without ever bothering to test them. For example, consider the theory that eating a kilogram of grass is a cure for the common cold. That theory makes experimentally testable predictions: if people tried the grass cure and found it ineffective, the theory would be proved false. But it has never been tested and probably never will be, because it contains no explanation — either of how the cure would work, or of anything else. We rightly presume it to be false. There are always infinitely many possible theories of that sort, compatible with existing observations and making new predictions, so we could never have the time or resources to test them all. What we test are new theories that seem to show promise of explaining things better than the prevailing ones do....Passing experimental tests is only one of many things a theory has to do to achieve the real purpose of science, which is to explain the world....The deeper an explanation is, the more remote from immediate experience are the entities to which it must refer. But these entities are not fictional: on the contrary, they are part of the very fabric of reality.
The more we discover, it seems, the further and more irrevocably we are propelled into the age of the specialist, and the more remote is that hypothetical ancient time when a single person's understanding might have encompassed all that was understood.
As new theories supersede old ones, our knowledge is becoming both broader (as new subjects are created) and deeper (as our fundamental theories explain more, and become more general). Depth is winning. Thus we are not heading away from a state in which one person could understand everything that was understood, but towards it.
....single-particle interference phenomena unequivocally rule out the possibility that the tangible universe around us is all that exists....In interference experiments there can be places in a shadow-pattern that go dark when new openings are made in the barrier casting the shadow. This remains true even when the experiment is performed with individual particles. A chain of reasoning based on this fact rules out the possibility that the universe we see around us constitutes the whole of reality. In fact the whole of physical reality, the multiverse, contains vast numbers of parallel universes.
A scientific argument is intended to persuade us that a given explanation is the best one available. It does not and could not say anything about how that explanation will fare when, in the future, it is subjected to new types of criticism and compared with explanations that have yet to be invented. A good explanation may make good predictions about the future, but the one thing that no explanation can even begin to predict is the content or quality of its own future rivals....Scientific problem-solving always includes a particular method of rational criticism, namely experimental testing. Where two or more rival theories make conflicting predictions about the outcome of an experiment, the experiment is performed and the theory or theories that made false predictions are abandoned. The very construction of scientific conjectures is focused on finding explanations that have experimentally testable predictions. Ideally we are always seeking crucial experimental tests — experiments whose outcomes, whatever they are, will falsify one or more of the contending theories....If a theory about observable events is untestable — that is, if no
possible observation would rule it out — then it cannot by itself explain why those events happen in the way they are observed to and not in some other way.For example, the ‘angel’ theory of planetary motion is untestable because no matter how planets moved, that motion could be attributed to angels; therefore the angel theory cannot explain the particular motions that we see, unless it is supplemented by an independent theory of how angels move. That is why there is a methodological rule in science which says that once an experimentally testable theory has passed the appropriate tests, any less testable rival theories about the same phenomena are summarily rejected, for their explanations are bound to be inferior.
According to inductivism, scientific theories are discovered by extrapolating the results of observations, and justified when corroborating observations are obtained. In fact, inductive reasoning is invalid, and it is impossible lo extrapolate observations unless one already has an explanatory framework for them. But the refutation of inductivism, and also the real solution of the problem of induction, depends on recognizing that science is a process not of deriving predictions from observations, but of finding explanations. We seek explanations when we encounter a problem with existing ones. We then embark on a problem-solving process. New explanatory theories begin as unjustified conjectures, which are criticized and compared according to the criteria inherent in the problem. Those that fail to survive this criticism are abandoned. The survivors become the new prevailing theories, some of which are themselves problematic and so lead us to seek even better explanations. The whole process resembles biological evolution. Thus we acquire ever more knowledge of reality by solving problems and finding better explanations. But when all is said and done, problems and explanations are located within the human mind, which owes its reasoning power to a fallible brain, and its supply of information to fallible senses. What, then, entitles a human mind to draw conclusions about objective, external reality from its own purely subjective experience and reason?

3. Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics
4. The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics by Jammer
5. Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics : MIT OpenCourseWare

6. What is Explanation? by Manning

What really is a dream?

Why do we have dreams?

1. The Nature and Function of Dreams by Rachel Berman:

Most dreams occur in REM (Rapid Eye Movement) sleep.

During the time of Freud (1856-1939) no knowledge of Inhibitory neurons was at hand, only Excitatory neurons were considered. Freud concluded that "nervous energy" - caused by some excitation, perhaps by a thought - wanders around until it finds a way to manifest itself may be in the form of visual imagery or dream.

Drs. Allan Hobson and Robert McCarley proposes the "Activation-Synthesis Model" : dreaming is caused physiologically by a “dream state generator,” which is located in the brain stem. It is “on” during REM sleep, while all sensory input and motor output are blocked, and the neurons in the cerebral cortex are activated by random impulses that generate sensory information within the nervous system. As Hobson and McCarley put it: “the activated forebrain then synthesizes the dream out of internally generated information, trying its best to make sense out of the nonsense it is being presented with."

Hobson’s and McCartey’s treatment of symbol formation is also in direct opposition with Freudian conception. They believe that “bizarre features” of a dream world are simply a reflection of the bizarre state (the bombardment with internal excitory signals, etc.) of the dreaming brain. That is, in the construction of a dream “the forebrain may be making the best of a bad job in producing even a partially coherent dream imagery from the relatively noisy signals sent up to it from the brain stem.” This implies that dreams have no emotional content since they are triggered only by sensory and motor aspects of bodily activity.

2. Dreams - Physiology:

We dream about 2 hrs a day. Lucid dreaming is when one becomes aware of one's own dreaming and may be able to control it.

3. Physiology and Psychology of Dreams by Alan S. Eiser: Though it has been found out that 80% of REM awakenings yield dreams, there are significant mental activities in NREM also. Typically, it is more thought like, fragmentary, and related to daily concerns than the vivid, hallucinatory, predominantly visual narratives that are most commonly reported from REM sleep. But even this distinction appears not to be absolute. There is now wide acceptance of the view that some dreaming that is indistinguishable from REM sleep dreaming occurs in NREM sleep, most frequently in the sleep-onset period.

It is a centrally important observation that dreaming undergoes a process of development and that it must be viewed in the context of the child’s developing cognitive capacities.

Translucent Onion

Monday, January 24, 2011

King Solomon's Ring

Saturday, January 22, 2011

The Periodic Table

Friday, January 21, 2011

DSP 1

Friday, January 7, 2011

On "Knowledge"

On "I"

On Memory

On Dreams

Sunday, January 2, 2011

The Positronic Man

Saturday, January 1, 2011

Some tidbit questions...